More from the inquest:
1. The operator says an almost identical fault happened the week before where the water pump failed, and water levels dropped to expose railings underneath the water. There was also a situation in 2001 where a 'pile up' of rafts occured
2. On the day of the accident he pressed the 'slow-stop' button 'two or three' times - this button takes 8 seconds to stop the ride (count to 8 in your head... it would seem like a lifetime in a situation like this)
3. The emergency button in the offload area (as I suspected it was) would have taken two seconds to stop the ride but was not pushed. Pushing this "wouldn’t have avoided (the tragedy), it may have limited some injuries"
4. The park had a policy where "if a ride breaks down more than twice, on the third time it gets shut for the day" (it was the third breakdown that the accident happened)https://www.news.com.au/national/queensland/stop-button-pushed-after-crash-dreamworld-inquest-hears/news-story/2a91daf1119d33ef6da284a34a6413c5
A.J. wrote:So let me get this straight here - when the pump failed the first time and they got it working again, did they not immediately cascade everyone off the ride, close the queue, and inspect it afterward? It sounds like when they reset the pump both times they just kept the ride going as if the problem never occurred.
Honestly I'm not sure, none of the reports make it clear whether it was a simple reset while the ride was running (it was one pump of several), or whether they did a full shutdown. It was obviously a recurring fault though.